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Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review
Caught Between Information and
Condemnation
The Kenyan Media in the Electoral Campaigns of December 2007
Brice Rambaud
1 The Kenyan media played an instrumental role both during campaigns leading to the
country’s general  elections in December 2007 and the ensuing political  mess that the
country was plunged into following the disputed re-election of President Mwai Kibaki.
Strategically placed in both occasions, it ably performed the double task of keeping the
public  well  informed of  the  political  events  as  they  unfolded  and at  the  same time
condemning wrongs by the political elite.
2 In its functional role as a civic educator, factual reporting took centre stage especially
during meetings and rallies.  The print media presented a platform for debate,  where
political activists and the civil society engaged each other in discussing key issues on the
political agenda (devolution of power, tackling corruption, etc.). M. Kibaki, the Party of
National  Unity  (PNU)  candidate,  seemed  to  receive  more  media  coverage  than  his
adversaries by virtue of being the sitting president. Nevertheless, it was felt that there
was  balanced  coverage  and  his  two  main  opponents—Raila  Odinga  of  the  Orange
Democratic  Movement  (ODM)  and  Kalonzo  Musyoka  of  the  Orange  Democratic
Movement-Kenya (ODM-K)—were given ample publicity.
3 Since November, the media fraternity in an act of condemnation spearheaded by the
press strongly denounced the strategies used by the two rival camps PNU and ODM. It was
felt that propaganda and ethnicisation of issues were the driving force in strategies to
gain  mass  support.  As  the  violence  progressed  in  the  Rift  Valley,  they  repeatedly
exonerated the political community. Reading the gravity of the postelection violence, the
main media houses made a concerted effort to promote responsible journalism. They
appealed for dialogue and national unity.
4 This ambivalence in the coverage of the elections that tore the media between informing
and condemning that will be focus of attention. The first highlight will be the enormous
attention the media gave politics during the electioneering period. Secondly, a spot light
on the print media will make it possible to analyse the stakes and debates in the election
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campaigns. The final point of focus will be media reaction to the political turbulence that
rocked the country after 30 December 2007,  a period marked by state clampdown on
media  freedom and unanimous condemnation of  the  violence and an unprecedented
professional unity.1
 
Politics—Kenyan media’s favourite theme
5 Kenyans show keen interest in their country’s politics. The local dailies jokingly refer to
them as “political animals”2 and the media understood this perfectly. There was demand
for complete coverage of the three main candidates, party news, candidate’s campaigns
or the campaign strategies of their respective teams. The media took full advantage of
these elections to advance real media freedom they enjoyed during the five years of M.
Kibaki’s presidency, which was characterized by an expanded democratic space.
 
The growth of Kenyan media under “Kibaki I”
6 The Moi regime (1978–2002) was characterised by many attempts to gag the media. The
government exercised a stranglehold control on the audio-visual sector until late 1990’s.
M. Kibaki’s first directive (2002–2007) was to allow full freedom of expression and the
emergence of private radio and television stations.3
 
Freedom of the press
7 In December 2007, the media, which plays a major role in providing checks and balances
against M. Kibaki’s presidency, lauded the wider democratic space achieved in the last
five years. According to The Daily Nation, Kenya’s leading daily newspaper, one of the main
contributions the Kibaki regime made was to nurture greater freedom of expression4. In
fact, State House no longer interfered with media content was the case before; wider
variety of opinions could be expressed; the government could tolerate criticism; the civil
society could speak with a stronger voice; and there was tolerance for a flurry of opinions
often bordering on defamation. Furthermore, the availability of information and images
in The Daily Nation and its close competitor The Standard,  strengthened the case for a
stronger  opposition.  There  was  mushrooming  of  commercial  private  radio  stations
broadcasting  in  English,  Kiswahili  and  local  vernaculars,  which  had  been  disallowed
during  the  Daniel  arap  Moi  era.  These  made  it  possible  to  disseminate  information,
especially to the rural fraternity. This greatly reduced monopoly of the state owned Kenya
Broadcasting Corporation.
8 The war  had not  been won yet.  Attacks  on press  freedom were  witnessed following
reports on M. Kibaki’s Cabinet and the first lady Lucy Kibaki. These were isolated cases
but they had a great impact. The so-called gutter press—sensationalist opinion press and
the multimedia outfit Standard Group suffered regular raids by the in 20035.  Tension
between the government, which had been accused of being deliberately slow in reacting
to  criticism since  losing  in  the  referendum of  2005,  and  the  press,  which  appeared
extremely unwavering towards the Kibaki administration, reached its peak on 2 March
2006. For no clear reason, the police raided The Standard printing press in the industrial
area and the KTN television station, owned by the same group6: copies of the daily were
burnt and production equipment confiscated. KTN had to suspend broadcast until the
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following day. The raid provoked demonstrations throughout the main cities and towns
across the country. The Standard Group registered huge losses in advertisement revenue.
The government called on all public service organisations to boycott the media house and




9 Greater freedom of expression led to significant liberalization of the electronic media
sector and the print media remained a beehive of activity. From 2002, the Kenyan media
registered unmatched economic growth. The number of media stakeholders grew further
emphasizing their role in the democratization process which began in 1991.
10 The print media continued to dominate.  The movers in the sector remained the two
dailies,  The  Daily  Nation and  The  Standard,  rivalling  each  other  in  distribution  and
influence over the Kenyan elite. The Daily Nation boasted the sale of 190,000 copies8 while
The  Standard registered  80,000 copies 9 sold.  Both  belong  to  the  two  great  historical
multimedia  houses—Nation  Media  Group  (NMG)  and  Standard  Group.  Their  editorial
approaches are not similar but they both made a remarkable effort at giving a balanced
coverage of the 2007 General Elections.
11 Reaffirming  dynamism  in  the  market  in  year  2007,  three  other  dailies  emerged,
increasing the total  number to eight.  NMG launched the Business  Daily specialising in
economic affairs and finance. This was followed shortly by The Daily Metro. Patrick Quarco
—the proprietor of the commercial radio stations Kiss FM and Classic 105—launched The
Nairobi Star. The last two were tabloids that drew inspiration from the English experience;
they offered the younger public a less political content in terms of “lifestyle, music, sport
and news in brief.”
12 The print media remained vibrant and quite diversified. In April 2007, the three-month
publication Expression Today by the Media Institute Organisation owned by David Makali
made a comeback into the media circles. It had been closed down in early 2003 when M.
Kibaki ascended to power.
13 Only the so-called “gutter” press seemed to be losing ground. Despite its availability in
Nairobi, (The Independent, Kenya Confidential, etc.), the public was no longer drawn to this
sensationalist  press as they were in the sunset days of  the Moi era (1997–2002).  The
leading newspaper in this category, The Weekly Citizen, seemingly came off better than the
others, producing 30,000 copies a fortnight.10
14 The growth in the media greatly benefited the electronic media sector, starting with the
radio. Since the liberalization of the airwaves just after 1996, the sector experienced rapid
expansion after 2003, with the Kibaki government allocating numerous frequencies to
private investors. As a result more than fifty stations were in operation in 2007. Alongside
KBC, many national and regional radio stations sprung up. Since 2003 privately owned
radio stations broadcasting in vernacular have mushroomed, initiated mainly by private
individuals, for example Kameme FM which transmits in kikuyu, Kass FM in Kalenjin,
Radio Victoria and Fish FM in Dholuo as well as a number initiated by the Royal Media
Services, which also founded Citizen FM and Citizen TV. In 1999 the group ventured into
radio broadcasting in vernacular  languages:  Inooro FM in Kikuyu and Ramogi  FM in
Dholuo, then Mulembe FM in Luhya, Musyi FM in Kikamba, Chamgei FM in Kalenjin, etc.
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15 The television sector saw the arrival of new players into the market: Sayare TV in 2004
and K24 in 2007. KBC still enjoyed the lion’s share of the market, but the Kenyan public
seemed to prefer the privately owned Kenya Television Network (KTN, started in 1990)
and Nation TV (NTV, since 1999). The two stations under the ownership of these highly
placed business rivals continue to thrive due to a growing advertising market.  Other
stations—the state controlled KBC and the privately owned Citizen TV, Stellavision TV
and Family TV seemed to be way behind in comparison to the quality of information and
“modernization”11 of programmes achieved by KTN and NTV.
16 The growth of the electronic media added a new dimension to the 2007 general elections.
The  reader,  the  listener  and  the  television  viewer  had  a  wide  range  of  sources  of
information in English, Kiswahili and other local languages to choose from. Furthermore,
advertising by political parties, which had been confined to the print media since the
return of multiparty politics in 1991 was redirected to the radio and to a lesser extent, the
television in the wake of the 2007 elections. Only an advert or two per day was dedicated
to advertising the big parties (especially PNU and ODM): much less than in 1992, 1997 and
2002, when parties used to spend record sums of money just to get an electronic media
presentation of their power structure.
17 Economic growth greatly favoured the three media powerhouses,  the NMG, Standard
Group and Royal Media Services. With the general elections round the corner these three
adopted diverse editorials which were greatly influenced by their owners.
 
Media integrated in politics
18 Electoral campaigns largely dominated media content and the Internet was not left out.
Certain editorial  columns featured prominently  during the electioneering period and
many journalists contested the polls as candidates.
 
A largely election-oriented content
19 The Kenyan media mobilized to cover the 2007 election campaign. Politics dominated
their content, especially after Kalonzo Musyoka announced he was running on the ODM-K
ticket.
20 For a period of five months, the print media, radio and television carried out a crucial
task of gathering information and comments.12 Journalists covered many meetings across
the nation. In a polarized field, PNU and ODM traded political blows to exhaustion with
mudslinging targeting politicians  in rival  camps.  Franck Ojiambo Wanyama,  Editorial
Administration  Manager  of  NMG,  admitted  the  fatigue  of  their  journalists  at  the
beginning of December 2007. He explained that large political parties were monotonous
in the way they held their meetings and that the journalists felt obliged to follow the
proceedings, all in the name of maintaining equal coverage of the two principals.13
21 The print media was particularly interested in the election campaigns: rallies, statements,
scrutinizing strategies, etc. In November and December 2007, nearly all the dailies and
weekly  newspapers  carried headlines  only  related to  the  campaigns.  During the  two
months, The Daily Nation set aside 5 to 13 pages of printed material on this one topic (a
varying total of 60 to 72 pages). The Standard gave it even more: from 6 to 15 pages per day
(a sum total of 40 pages)!14 Other newspapers The People Daily (50,000 copies) and The
Kenya  Times (15,000)  bore  the  same  “electoral  gravitation.”  A  tendency  with  two
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consequences: a rather monotonous content and the impression that Kenya had no other
news other than politics.
22 The political debate took centre stage in the press. Newspapers reported and commented
on positions of political activists and the civil society (mainly lawyers and members of
various churches) on the main campaign issues and the Kibaki-Raila confrontation. They
assessed the first five years of Kibaki’s presidency and stressed the change in the Cabinet,
from the euphoric ascent to power with NARC to the 2005 constitutional referendum
defeat.  They scrutinized “the Kibaki  legacy,” which according to them constituted five
years  of  sustained  economic  growth  but  poor  performance  in  the  fight  against
corruption.
23 The  electronic  media  sector  equally  gave  excellent  coverage  to  the  elections.  The
morning, midday and evening bulletins as well as the endless talk shows gave prominence
to  the  campaigns.  Every  piece  of  material  was  discussed,  contested  and  politicized.
Commercial  radio  stations,  which  owed  their  growth  to  advertisements  (talk-shows,
music), found it difficult to ignore the subject. Thus, Kiss FM, among the first commercial
radio stations in Kenya,15 started a half hourly report or news on the elections “Kiss 100
Election  Update”;  the  closely  followed  Sunday  talk  show  Crossfire,  was  nothing  but
politics! Its sister station Classic 105 redirected “Kivumbi”—a talk-show in English and
Kiswahili on social issues to concentrate on a sole topic, politics.
24 Television  was  also  dominated  by  election  campaigns.  Alongside  the  newspapers,
television stations carried reports on rallies held by the three main parties. Government
controlled television station, KBC followed M. Kibaki’s rallies closely. Private television
stations were more inclusive. Generally speaking, most of the rallies held by M. Kibaki,
R. Odinga  and  K.  Musyoka  were  covered,  but  the  sitting  president,  by virtue  of  his
position  often  stole  the  headlines.  The  two  market  leaders,  KTN  and  NTV,  had
comprehensive coverage of election news.
25 The two groups behind these stations invested in ultramodern technical equipment to
stay on top of the television sector in order to find a place in this fast expanding market.
There  were  huge  financial  implications  enabled  by  a  large  advertising  budget.  NMG
purchased 10 Outside Broadcasting Vans (OBV) while The Standard Group bought eight.
These vans were equipped with satellite antenna and would allow a team composed of a
cameraman  and  an  editor  to  transmit  live  broadcast  and  record  pictures,  run  a
commentary on a topic before sending it for editing16. KTN and NTV also acquired lighter
equipment for their cameramen, notably the Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN), to
record  and  send  images  via  wireless  Internet.  These  two  technological  investments
allowed the stations to cover the campaign throughout the country. The electronic media
battle continued to heat up in Kenya.
26 What  is  more,  the  initiative  in  the  television  sector  and  the  political  programmes
broadcast throughout the year, demonstrated the private stations’ eagerness to inform
the public about the stakes in the elections. A case in point is the NTV productions of
several special weekly programmes at its Nairobi studio and in the field: The People’s Voice,
On the Spot, Turning on your vote, Agenda Kenya. The Making of a Nation was a new weekly
political  programme,  produced  under  the  auspices  of  Hillary  Ng’weno,  a  renowned
Kenyan political analyst. This historical programme lasting 30 minutes, with images and
interviews, retraced the political path of Kenya through its memorable events
(independence, the assassination of Tom Mboya, the 1982 coup attempt, etc.). The aim
was to place the 2007 election on a global context and to understand the history of issues
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introduced in the campaign (Majimbo, the Kikuyu—Luo rivalry in Kenyan politics, etc.).
The Making of a Nation, adapted from a publication by Ng’weno, was published every week
in The Daily Nation.
 
Mobilisation of NTIC
27 In 2007, the electoral campaign the New Technologies of Information and Communication
(NTIC) widely used, in particular the Internet and the SMS,17 at best (news and debates)
and at worst (shunning others on ethnic grounds).
28 The Nation Media Group and The Standard group, had vibrant Internet sites for their
dailies—http://www.nationmedia.com and  http://www.eastandard.net respectively,
which were specifically set up for the elections. NMG’s Kenya Elections 200’18 combined
articles on election campaign as published in The Daily Nation, NMG journalists’ weblogs
and NTV video reporting, which was aired in partnership with the YouTube site. These
were essentially a collection of reports on meetings,  party press conferences and the
satirical political programme “Bull’s Eye.” This multimedia site proved quite popular with
the Kenyan Diaspora judging by the comments after each video,19 which was the ultimate
goal of the group. The Standard Group on the other hand launched a platform on the
Internet  to cover the elections.20 It  reviewed newspaper articles  by order via special
manuals. There was good coverage of the elections on this website.
29 The internet was also a platform for debates and expression of opinions. Consequently
Kenyan blogs increased in 2007. The one that caught the media’s attention was that of Joe
Kadhi21 a renowned journalist. Candidates in the elections had their websites too.22
30 The NTIC were also used with hostile intentions. Towards the end of 2007, mailboxes of
Kenyans were full of spams and “black mails” from political activists. The PNU—ODM war
really took root on the net. Spams and correspondence from one camp spread rumours
and  ethnic  attacks  on  the  rival  camp.  Similar  techniques  of  misinformation  about
opponents aimed discrediting them were used through the SMS.
31 The “Black SMS” or “Black Propaganda SMS,” circulating through mobile phones, became
the subject of numerous articles in the press. For example in early December, an SMS
announced  the  sudden  death  of  an  ODM  representative,  Fred  Gumo,  candidate  for
Nairobi’s Westlands constituency when he was alive and well.23 Other rumours circulating
via SMS included the plot to rig the elections, by printing “parallel” ballot papers in
Belgium,24 a PNU minister implicated in this scheme to steal the election and members of
the  Electoral  Commission  of  Kenya  (ECK)  were  supposedly  in  cahoots  with  the
government.25
32 On a positive note, the SMS did not only serve the propaganda of political activists, but
the  media  used it  to  interact  with  the  public.  The  NMG launched a  service  to  send
information in real time via SMS (Nationmobile, Break 6667). Other tabloids Daily Metro
and Nairobi Star followed suit with their special columns (SMSChat) which allowed readers
to express themselves. Some electronic media talk-shows encouraged the public to give
their views about topics of discussion via their mobile phone.26
 
Media as political players
33 The role of the Kenyan media was not limited to covering the election campaign and
informing the citizen: certain groups or editorials clearly took sides with candidates in
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the race; some media were directly created by parties they supported; journalists even
contested for seats in the elections. In Kenya, the media became a political player in every
sense of the word.27
34 The first evidence of the relationship between the media and politics, as is always the
case  during each election period in the multiparty era,  newspapers  and radios  were
created by political parties during campaign periods to offer support for their candidates.
This  was  clearly  obvious  in  the  press:  PNU launched  The  Jamhuri  Magazine,  entirely
dedicated to M. Kibaki, The News Review published every two months was pro-ODM and
Newsbreak, ODM-K. In the electronic media, we see the radio Umoja, started three months
before the elections by R. Odinga’s allies, with massive pro-ODM content.
35 The second indication is that the 2007 general elections were characterized by a number
of journalists seeking parliamentary and civic seats mostly on the small party tickets.
From the managing editor to an ordinary reporter, many media professionals joined the
fray to campaign for an elective post. Chacha Mwita, Managing Editor of Standard Group
up to September 2007, contested the Kuria constituency seat. Yusuf Hassan of the BBC
sought to capture the Kamukunji seat. Moses Kanyira, of Kameme FM, eyed Tetu. Pamela
Mburia, radio journalist at KBC, was a candidate in Nithi constituency. Njoroge Karanja,
formerly of Royal Media Services, contested in Subukia constituency against incumbent
MP Koigi wa Wamwere, immediate former Assistant Minister of Information, himself a
prolific  editorialist  (for  The People  Daily).  In the gutter  press,  Tom Alwaka,  managing
editor of Weekly Citizen, contested the Emuhaya parliamentary seat while his editor-in-
chief, William Kyavi, stood as councillor at Makina Ward.
36 A  highly  politicized  profession  notwithstanding,  political  ambition  by  journalists
indicated  that  their  work  could  be  seen  as  a  springboard  to  political  careers.  The
journalists took advantage not only of their technical know-how and political activists’
ability  to  communicate,  but  also  of  their  popularity  among  the  masses  to  launch  a
political career. In the end, numerous media were partial. There was need to look deeper
into the media structures, notably the strategic groups—to know what was at the core of
their political orientation that influences their news reporting.
37 M. Kibaki dominated coverage in the electronic media category, with the state-owned
KBC and the Royal Media Services ensuring his domination. The Standard Group and the
daily The Kenya Times fluctuated between criticizing the Kibaki  government and pro-
Kibaki reactions by KANU activists. This gave them a balanced outlook with regard to the
campaign and an incisive endeavour in analysing the Kibaki administration. The Daily
Nation, like all the NMG media, was perceived to be in favour of the incumbent due to
numerous state advertisements but deeper analysis of the content showed that the group
had widespread coverage of the two principals; meetings with the directors of the group
revealed that NMG did not take sides due to economic reasons. As for the other media,
notably the commercial radio stations like Kiss FM, the NMG media, through The Daily
Nation, Taifa Leo, Business Daily newspapers, the weekly The East African, NTV television
Easy FM radio took extra care to give equitable coverage to M. Kibaki, R. Odinga and to a
lesser extent K. Musyoka in order to show support for all their clients’ parties.
38 With regard to television, a study on media monitoring led by the Strategic Research and
Public Relations and financed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), from
27 November to 10 December 2007, confirmed some hidden dispositions:
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 M. Kibaki R. Odinga K. Musyoka
KTN 35 33 26
NTV 33 37 27
Citizen TV 56 27 12
KBC 54 29 15
Source: UNDP and Strategic Research PR in The Daily Nation, 14 December 2007: ‘You’re biased,
Kivuitu tells KBC’
39 While KTN and NTV made an effort give a balanced coverage of the electoral campaign,
Citizen  TV  (belonging  to  Royal  Media  Services)  and  KBC  restricted  themselves  to
information adversely in favour of the PNU camp. In the two stations, M. Kibaki appeared
twice as much as R. Odinga. These quantitative statistics are similarly reflected at the
qualitative level.
40 KBC radio and television became the government’s mouthpiece after the defeat of M.
Kibaki  at  the 2005 referendum. Former Managing Editor of  Standard Group,  Wachira
Waruru, headed KBC from 2003 to 2005. This was a major step in the profession. But W.
Waruru was  shown the door  after  the  “NO” campaign triumphed and was  promptly
replaced by  David  Waweru.  Editorial  and production policy  gradually  became biased
along ethnic lines.28 In 2007, KBC extensively campaigned for M. Kibaki, covering PNU
rallies live for hours in the afternoon while R. Odinga only got a few minutes in the
evening bulletin.  This propaganda was disheartening for the profession,  according to
Mugo Theuri, editor-in-chief of People Daily:
KBC is a tragedy. It used to be better before, but once again it is a propaganda tool.
There are many well trained journalists, but they do not want to do journalism,
they want to be public servants above all!29
41 Even Samuel Kivuitu, Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) confessed
disappointment by the partiality displayed by the state media.30 His letters of protest to
the government yielded nothing.
42 M. Kibaki could also bank on undying support from Citizen TV and to a larger extent all
the media owned by Royal Media Services group, print media through The Leader weekly
and various radio stations (Citizen FM and the nine vernacular radio stations). The group
proprietor, Mr. S. K Macharia is a close friend of Kibaki and they are both from Nyeri. He
supported M. Kibaki’s campaign in the 2002 elections. Five years later he is back again.
This shrewd businessman was able to expand his chain of companies during the Kibaki
era, thanks to radio frequencies allocated by the government from 2003. During the 2007
electoral campaign, the boss gave the client a boost. Mr. S.K. Macharia was known to pry
into affairs of his chain of companies, according to Benjamin Wangari, a radio presenter
in kikuyu Inooro FM:
Yes, he interferes. Just like everyone else! Royal Media Services is pro-Kibaki, not
openly, but indirectly. Macharia decides the editorial policy and he can call me this
morning and say: ‘Kibaki is in Kitale for a rally, go to Kitale and report on that.’
43 S.K.  Macharia  avoids  bureaucracy,  choosing  to  manipulate  the  work  of  his  editorial
manager  through  internal  memos  and  sanctioning  any  deviants.31 In  the  group’s
vernacular radio stations,  M. Kibaki is  represented in positive light.  Only one station
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Ramogi FM, which transmits in Dholuo in the Nyanza region, covered R. Odinga more, as
he proved very popular in the region.
 
Radios and “ethnic disposition” in the voting process
44 The final level of politicization of the electronic media is evident in Ramogi FM. The local
radio stations broadcasting in vernacular languages provided immense coverage for the
preferred party and politician in their area of broadcast.
45 Kenyans voted in blocs and in most cases for the representative of their ethnic group at
the national level.  Therefore,  in line with the political majority strength and listener
representation in that  community,  it  appeared that  local  language media was biased
towards a particular candidate. The electoral mood of the public in support of any of the
three main candidates directly influenced the editorial orientation of a regional radio. M.
Kibaki  seemed  to  be  overwhelmingly  preferred  by  listeners  in  Central  Province:  his
campaign was largely covered by the radios transmitting in kikuyu like Inooro FM and
Kameme FM. R. Odinga was super popular in Western and Nyanza provinces: Fish FM and
Ramogi FM raised his mast higher than his contestants. K. Musyoka was favoured in his
native  Eastern  Province:  Musyi  FM  strongly  covered  his  campaign.  Radio  stations
transmitting in vernaculars treated the election with partiality, but in Kenya economic
motives prevail, as Benjamin Wangari shares:
Yes, the political editorial of a local radio station depends on the vote in the area of
transmission. Most of the people who understand Kikuyu were for Kibaki. He will
probably have 90% of the votes in Central Province, his stronghold. Therefore we
cannot give much information about Raila, otherwise we lose audience.32
46 While  the  voting  took  an  ethnic  twist,  some  stations  were  careful  not  to  irk  their
listeners. This is the case of Inooro FM. B. Wangari explains the necessity of caution in the
administration of vernacular radio stations in a country where the ethnic background is
politicized and the scope of an electoral campaign plays strongly on the sentiments of the
community: thus at Inooro FM, very little was said on the land issues between Kikuyu and
Kalenjin or even the implication of the Kikuyu in the national economy, to avoid inciting
the two groups.
47 But this consideration does not apply to all. Some stations carried messages of hate. This
was the case with Kass FM (in Kalenjin), which heavily campaigned for ODM and was
accused  of  carrying  materials  of  xenophobic  nature  vis-à-vis  other  communities
(especially Kikuyu) and even individuals (mainly from the Kibaki administration).33 There
are two sides to the problem: the lack of education on the part of journalists or presenters
and the increase in talk-shows which gave voice to listeners holding opposing views,
without a real  anchor34.  Chris Odwesso,  editor-in-chief of Kenya Times,  had a word of
advice on the orientation of these radio stations during the electoral period.
Local radio stations have advantages: they encourage community participation in
politics, promote their culture and language. This is a new market for the Kenyan
media. But during the elections period, the tribal interests were at their strongest.
They toyed with ethnic loyalty to win the audience. They had a negative campaign35
.
48 The dichotomy existed between professionalism displayed by some stations and radical
utterances on the part of others. Then there was the ambivalence of reaching the public
and handling news, which was equally mirrored in the print media.
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The election campaign in the press (The Standard and 
The Daily Nation)
49 In the analysis of election campaign coverage by the print media for the period between
27 November and 27 December 2007, specifically in The Daily Nation and The Standard, the
role of the press fluctuated between providing mass information and condemning rising
violence in the country. While the task of correcting injustices seemed to be yielding
fruit, media attacks became more aggressive as the campaign gained momentum at the
start of December 2007.
 
Ethnic case for informing and condemning
Editorial directives in the print media
50 The Kenyan daily newspapers were well prepared to cover the election campaigns. All
editions  carried  rallies  and  statements  and  their  management  teams  during  in  the
summer of 2007 implemented their editorial policy. Some groups like The Standard Group
organized special training for their reporters. The newly formed Media Council, a self
regulatory media body,36 in partnership with the (UNDP),  also organized training for
journalists who needed it. It also released a code of conduct to cover the elections, which
was accepted in all the big media houses. The code of conduct appealed for the respect of
the freedom of expression of all, a balanced and non-partisan coverage of the principal
candidates and the admonition of ethnic strife. These were observed in the course of
November and December 2007 by the leading newspapers in Kenya. On the global scale,
the print media treated the elections in a balanced and responsible manner, even though
M. Kibaki had a little edge over his opponents mainly due to his position as incumbent
president.
51 M. Kibaki, R. Odinga and K. Musyoka regularly appeared in the news pages. The opening
pages of the dailies for the next two months only reported on their rallies and party press
conferences,  where comments on their  proposals  often attracted debate.  In The Daily
Nation and The Standard, we generally found the same level of reporting on the campaigns
by  both  M.  Kibaki  and  R.  Odinga.  These  dailies  also  selected  headlines  where  both
candidates  appeared  together  in  a  photograph.  This effort  towards  “quantitative
impartiality” could be viewed in two ways: a poor coverage of parliamentary candidates
and  the  virtual  insignificance  of  “small”  candidates  in  the  presidential  race.  The
specialized dailies, the business-oriented Business Daily (of NMG), The Nairobi Star and The
Daily Metro tabloids gave little attention to the campaigns.
52 The study of press content carried out by Strategic Research for UNDP37 by Steadman and
Associates38 during the campaigns confirm that the press was balanced in its coverage of
the elections. But the Kenyan reader perceived The People Daily as a pro-PNU paper, The
Kenya Times and The Standard seemed pro-ODM while The Daily Nation leaned towards PNU.
53 Why these perceptions? The People Daily belongs to Kenneth Matiba, a Kikuyu political
leader, like M. Kibaki. The Daily Nation was less critical of the state and the incumbent, if
the  advertisements  published in  it  were  anything to  go by.  It  seemed like  a  Kikuyu
stronghold, therefore certainly PNU.39 The forces behind Kenya Times and The Standard
were indigenous to KANU, the opposition party from 2003 to 2007.
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54 But the findings contradict this public perception. K. Matiba did not turn The People into
a political instrument, and his rivalry with M. Kibaki is well known.40 The Kenya Times was
sharply critical of M. Kibaki until the realignment of KANU with PNU in September 2007,
which called for a less aggressive shift in editorial positioning. The main force behind The
Standard was the retired president D. arap Moi, who sided with M. Kibaki’s in the 2007
elections. But, if it is true that D. arap Moi’s support made M. Kibaki more noticeable in
this  daily  and  “reduced”  its  criticism  of  the  incumbent  remains  a  weighty  issue.
Preferences of The Standard journalists signified determination to “side” with M. Kibaki
who had,  according to them, done little  to fight corruption and poorly redistributed
wealth.41 Furthermore the newspaper seemed to forget the constant efforts to gag the
freedom of the press which was their favourite subject since 2003. Finally, in the matter
of radio stations transmitting in vernacular, The Standard covered the election as part of
its public objective. Douglas Okwatch, News Editor of the daily, corroborates it:
In terms of editorial policy, we cover the two candidates as fairly as possible. We try
to give them equal space and content. But we are seen as an opposition newspaper…
it is a question of perception and communication. If you follow our operations you
will notice that we sell more in the opposition regions: Nyanza, Rift Valley, and
Coastal Provinces. Therefore if we carried a positive story on the government, we
would sell less!42
55 In Kenya, the opinion polls conducted by the media concluded that it was the readership
that determined editorial orientation of a newspaper and not the reverse. Consequences
in the perspective: though M. Kibaki and R. Odinga were covered equally The Standard,
consideration for the electorate determined the choice of headlines and a critical angle
against M. Kibaki and pages filled with commentaries from the civil society criticizing
developments in Kenya in the last five years. Economic consequences: apart from public
advertisements in The Standard, the paper attracted election announcements by ODM but
M. Kibaki’s campaign team seemed to avoid advertising in The Standard, preferring The
Daily Nation, which sold well and had other strongholds (Nairobi, Central Province).
56 42 The editorial  orientation of  The  Daily  Nation  was a  lot  more consensual.  Avoiding
unsettling anyone, the leading daily in Kenya reported more on ECK’s meetings and the
preparation of the election itself while the number of opinion articles on the political
situation decreased and seemed to have less significance. Each day, the publication took
calculated measures to ensure equitable reporting for both PNU and ODM. The same
economic reasons were given by NMG. According to F.O. Wanyama, “if The Nation publishes
pro-Kibaki stories, those supporting Odinga will not buy the paper: that has no economic weight!”43
This was confirmed by Jaindi Kisero, Managing Editor of the regional weekly of NMG, The
EastAfrican,  confiding  that  when  a  paper  chooses  a  political  camp  it  loses  on  the
commercial front.44
57 In  certain  articles  by  Nairobians,  it  was  reported  that  the  Aga  Khan,  the  majority
shareholder of NMG, asked the group management not to take sides, in order to safeguard
the future of his multiple interests in Kenya.
 
Jounalists’ version of ethnicity
58 The ethnic angle in the 2007 election campaigns was ever-present—ODM, and to an extent
PNU, conducted their campaigns with ethnic inclinations—compared to the 2002 election,
where this was non-existent.45 Despite certain laid down principles, the media themselves
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could not escape unscathed. This was evident in the relationship between the editorial
orientation and the audience of the radio sector.
59 In December 2007, the print media clearly portrayed in an opinion poll that people were
going to vote in blocs along ethnic lines. Thus on 10 December, The Daily Nation revealed
in a headline the results of opinion poll on the intentions of voting by region. It was
evident that: “the candidates’ strongholds. The supporters of the principal aspirants in the race to
State House expect to receive from their leaders a big share of the national cake if they win the
presidency”:
17 days to the general election, observations by the opinion pollsters show that the
principal candidates in the presidential race enjoy a near-fanatic support in their
area of origin (…). According to the last opinion poll by Steadman, President Kibaki
enjoys 91% popularity in the Central province; M. Odinga enjoys 78% of intended
vote in Nyanza, while M. Musyoka would obtain 45% of the votes in Eastern. The
Executive Director of the Strategic PR Research firm, Mr. Caesar Handa, said the
distribution  of  the  national  resources  represents  the  main  reason  why  the
individuals  prefer  to  vote  for  someone from their  community,  especially  in  the
presidential elections.
60 This  regional  support  almost  cost  M.  Kibaki  and  R.  Odinga  the  campaign  in  their
respective strongholds, as they chose to concentrate their efforts in the areas which were
undecided, like the Rift Valley. The reintroduction of the ethnic argument in the general
elections constitutes an extension of the “NO” campaign camp (Orange) during the 2005
constitutional  referendum,  which  rested  on  the  exacerbation  of  a  parallel  between
“them” (the Kikuyu who were accused of amassing the wealth of the country) and “us”
(all the other ethnic groups, which felt dispossessed). ODM, a party that emerged from
the 2005 “NO” movement, the campaign strategy did not change: the concept was to
appear as representative of the groups marginalised from power and those from least
developed areas. In fact, the campaign became an attack on the “Other” (the Kikuyu clan
in power accused of not redistributing the wealth). Numerous articles appeared in the
print media condemning the use of ethnicity by politicians. This condemnation amounts
to  double  speak.  On the  one  hand,  journalists  criticized  M.  Kibaki  of  having  mostly
appointed the political elite from his group (Kikuyu) to his Cabinet and his administration
and specifically from his area (Nyeri),  especially after defeat in the 2005 referendum.
According to them that constituted a fatal political error and it frustrated the elite from
other groups not represented in the government. This engraved in the people’s spirit the
idea that it is only through the presidency that the redistribution of public resources is
possible.46 On  the  other  hand,  the  campaign  strategy  and  utterances  of  ODM  were
outrageous:  in  its  rallies  and proposals,  the  pentagon was  stirring  up  of  sentiments
against Kikuyu elite in power and the central government.47
61 Ethnicity was a regular theme in the press, particularly in the Opinion pages. The Daily
Nation and The Standard denounced its  over-hyping in an aggressive campaign where
every tool  was used;  massive use of  ethnic identity,  propaganda and misinformation,
accusations  and  counter-accusations  of  fraud  dictated  the  rhythm  of  the  campaign
coverage in the media; one expression featured constantly in the dailies: “Dirty politics”48.
The editorialists of both papers expressed a common dissatisfaction: personification of
parties and the lack of truly competitive manifestos; polarisation of discussions, with a
strong  PNU-ODM  presence  crystallised  around  identities  leading  to  obvious  voter
response (the Kikuyu overwhelmingly voted for PNU, the Luo ODM, the Kamba ODM-K,
etc.);  the  creation  of  perceptions  of  passion  that  are  beyond  description  or
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rationalization,  but  which  signify  a  potential  ticking  bomb.  By  invoking  ethnicity,  a
politician seeks to create “loyalty by obligation” of the individual in relation to the ethnic
community, which robs democracy of its essence because it impairs debate. Arguments
only appeal to the emotion and the irrational.
62 The two dailies made a special effort to enlighten the masses in order to place ethnicity
on the historical map of Kenya as a state49, and above all to explain that it can only be
seen as an electoral lever50 for the individuals. The Daily Nation recalled that: “Ethnic hatred
is  perpetuated to  win votes.”51 In the same daily,  Philip Ochieng’,  a columnist,  calls  for
understanding and unity between the groups in order to fight the real enemy of the state,
the post colonial economy, in a column entitled “Do not be afraid of the other tribe, embrace
it.” He wishes that the educated always aspire to this “most basic passion” and warns the
reader:
The leader of a large ethnic group is never really motivated by the suffering of his
community. His interest is only to excite the group in order to enhance his personal
political power and his financial ambitions. That is why the leaders agitate to raise
a mass of social imbeciles.
63 The newspapers also called for individual responsibility on the part of voters, to vote for
ideas and not identity affiliation52. Professional in its effort to inform and condemn, the
daily press attacked ethnicity with great discretion. Journalists chose in some instances
not to reproduce the equivocal utterances of certain politicians at rallies. The Opinion and
Letters to the Editor pages of the leading newspapers were also closely monitored to sieve
any hate  messages  so as  not  to  fan any differences  in an already polarized political
environment.53
64 As for the vernacular radios, there was however some detour in the press. Even as the
dailies exercised responsibility in covering the campaigns and dealing with the issue of
ethnicity the basic moral principles of the profession were trashed by the “gutter press.”
Every  “gutter”  newspaper  took  sides  with  a  political  party.  Being  pro-Kikuyu,  The
Independent (8000 copies a week)  by Mburu Muchoki  carried out  a spirited campaign
against R. Odinga, which culminated in the 17 December 2007 edition in which the ODM
leader was compared to Hitler in the paper’s headlines.54 On the other hand, The Weekly
Citizen continuously attacked M. Kibaki: the headlines of the issues preceding the election
said that R. Odinga was only a few days from a historic ascension to power55 and that M.
Kibaki was preparing to vacate State House.56 This biased treatment of the campaign was
accompanied by ethnic accusations.  The 10 December edition of the same weekly,  for
example, wanted to prove in page 3 that 80% of officers of the City Education Department
were Kikuyu from Mount Kenya region. There was a list bearing name, designation and
ethnic group of each employee to drive the point home.
 
Information and condemnation of violence
65 The print media without a doubt played its  role of  informing,  covering the electoral
campaigns of the three main parties (PNU, ODM, and ODM-K) and their preparation for
the elections, by informing the public about the strategies of political players. The press
also provided a platform for political debate. Finally, in the face of escalating electoral
violence, it transformed itself into a campaigner for moral issues.
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Information role
66 The Daily Nation and The Standard carried out a significant task of gathering information.
From 27 November to 27 December 2007, an averagely high number of 18 reports were
published per day in The Daily Nation and 15 in The Standard. Articles containing analysis
material featured less prominently. During that period, the average was 3.3 articles of
daily commentaries in The Daily Nation and 2.5 for The Standard.
67 Certain trends in this prolific covering of the campaigns have been ignored. The two
dailies closely followed the PNU and ODM campaigns, as they held rallies throughout the
country  and  ODM-K  campaigns  to  some  extent:  reports,  recorded  speeches,  press
conferences,  and  detailed  pledges  by  candidates.  The  election  by  the  Electoral
Commission  of  Kenya  (ECK)  was  also  closely  monitored,  especially  the  technical
preparation (printing and distribution of the ballot papers,  polling stations,  etc.)  The
chairman of the electoral commission, Samuel Kivuitu, featured a lot in the print media.
He  frequently  spoke  on  developments  in  the  preparation  for  the  elections  to  allay
uncertainties since ODM and ODM-K campaign teams had expressed possible election
fraud on the part of PNU. Throughout the month of December they questioned Kivuitu on
the matter. From the allegations relayed in the press and to which S. Kivuitu’s response
remained: “Prove what you are saying,” R. Odinga’s campaign strategy seemed to be three-
fold: occupy the media playing field; discredit PNU, which had been accused of using state
machinery (police and provincial administration) to seek M. Kibaki’s re-election; to pose
as the victim.57
68 Worth noting is that the ECK placed many advertisements in the two dailies appealing to
Kenyans to vote,  with bold slogans in both English and Swahili:  “Don’t  complain about
corruption if you don’t vote,” “Elect leaders who don’t buy votes,” “Elect leaders who don’t incite
violence” and explaining how to vote using sample ballot papers. The print media also
took part in the publication of official announcements. On 30 November 2007, The Daily
Nation published a list of all parliamentary candidates, over 2000 names on three pages.
69 On the other hand, we ought to acknowledge the efforts by the print media to shed light
on predictions and strategies of various political players in the elections, especially in the
Sunday papers and in disapproving certain prevalent practices in Kenya like buying of
votes. There were also articles which exposed ineffectiveness of electoral programmes, on
the one hand, and their feasibility, on the other.58 The Standard expressed scepticism on
the promise by the opposition to deliver a new constitution after only six months if
elected.59
70 The press called for more transparency in the elections and in some daily editions they
denounced undemocratic practices by Kenyan politicians. The Daily Nation dedicated a
pull-out  report  in  its  15 December  edition  on  the  buying  of  votes  by  parliamentary
candidates, after a study carried out by the African Centre for Good Governance.60 An
article revealed that almost Ksh 900 million was used to bribe voters in the selection of
candidates during party nominations. UNDP figures show that rich politicians spent up to
Ksh 80,000  per  day  in  buying  votes.  The  Daily  Nation also  claimed that  many  voters
accepted the money but were free to make their own choice at the ballot box. Another
short article gave examples of politicians who invested a lot in this practice in 1997 and
2002 and still lost in the elections.61
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71 On 18 December The Standard criticized the secret use of public funds and resources by
ministers during the campaign.62 The front pages and three inside pages carried a report
by  the  Kenya  National  Commission  on  Human  Rights  (KNCHR)  highlighting  seven
ministers  of  the  and  public  service  employees  in  illegitimate  use  of  state  resources
(money,  vehicles,  etc.)  in  election  campaigns.  The  article  demands  a  thorough  and
transparent investigation by the government.63
72 Finally, media coverage the 2007 election campaigns was marked by significant opinion
polls that were conducted by media groups and well covered by all the media. This is not
a new practice but it was the first time pollsters in Kenya, notably Steadman Research,
Consumer Insight, Infotrak Harris, Gallup and Strategic Research—conducted the polls
with dedication and their results so widely documented.
73 From September 2007,  opinion  polls  on  voter  intentions  concerning  the  presidential
election was carried out and published in the leading dailies. Soon afterwards they were
conducted and announced weekly. The Daily Nation showed the greatest interest in the
results  of  the  surveys.64 Changes  in  the  results  of  surveys  on  voter  intentions  were
minimal. R. Odinga systematically took the lead. The distribution of results by province
revealed the high popularity of the ODM candidate in Nyanza, Western and North Eastern
provinces while M. Kibaki’s strength was in the Central Province.
 
The press a channel of the civil society
74 Beyond their initial role of informing, The Daily Nation and The Standard provided a forum
for broad political debate in the Kenyan media.
75 Opinion pages of the leading dailies were full of writings on the principal parties in the
elections. Special pages were created specifically for political debate. There was ‘Election
Platform’ in The Daily Nation or the ‘The Big Three debate’ in The Standard. On one page,
and in three separate articles, the leaders or representatives of the three leading parties
engaged each other on a particular issue and outlined their agenda. These debate pages,
which were published weekly and nearly daily closer to the elections, were reduced to a
PNU-ODM battlefield towards the end of the campaign rather than platforms of proposals
or explanations.65
76 Letters to the editor in the two dailies were equally politicized and allowed the public to
express  themselves  on  events  making  news.  One  page  ‘The  people’s  voice,’  carried
comments  and  was  frequently  read.  This  was  a  way  for  the  newspapers  to  pass  on
findings and messages. Thus, when Lucy Kibaki increased her allowance as First Lady
before the elections  from Ksh 350,000 to  Ksh 500,000,  The  Standard published a  letter
entitled ‘First Lady’s allowance increase is ridiculous,’66 revealing the papers’ stand on
political issues.
77 The dailies acted more as a mouthpiece of civil society that was deeply involved in the
elections. Various activists were featured in the media: the Christian churches, the Law
Society  of  Kenya  (notably  its  chairman  Okong’o  O’Mogeni)  and  the  Kenya  National
Commission on Human Rights (led by Maina Kiai).  The first  two activists  were quite
conversant with the political debate in Kenya since the struggle for democracy in the late
1980s.
78 The clergy greatly intervened in the two debates that marked the campaigns: the issue of
decentralization fronted by ODM and ODM-K and R. Odinga’s agreement with Muslim
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leaders in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). These two elicited a lot of comments
in the media. Members of the Clergy expressed themselves from the point of view of the
institution they represented rather than their own behalf.
79 The debate on decentralization monopolized the commentary pages of the dailies from
the end of October to early December 2007. Everyone took sides on a vaguely defined
proposal  (decentralisation?  federalism?  majimboism?).  The  Catholic,  Anglican,
Presbyterian,  Methodist  and  the  Episcopal  Conference  of  Kenya  registered  their
disagreement with this proposal, most critical being the Catholic Church, which at this
point seemed to be in conflict with ODM.67
80 The second debate,  the signing of  a  Memorandum of  Understanding (MoU),  after  an
agreement between the ODM candidate and the National Muslims Leaders Forum: Muslim
leaders declared their support for ODM in the campaign while R. Odinga would embark on
incorporating the  Muslim community  in  the  state,  in  particular  in  the  public  sector
employment, and develop the regions that are predominantly Muslim with his policy of
decentralization.68 This  agreement  was  widely  rejected  by  all  the  Christian  churches
(catholic,  protestant,  evangelical).  They intervened through discussion forums in  the
press, in advertisements or via press conferences. They did not want an accord made in
public between a political and a religious group as this raise tension between religious
communities, or cause political conflict along religious lines.69 The Christian churches
know how to communicate with journalists, and their criticisms feature prominently in
the media.
81 Another civil  society activist  which was active in the media was the Kenya National
Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) together with its chairman Maina Kiai. Despite his
frequent appearance in the media M. Kiai had great difficulty in efforts to incorporate
human rights into the political agenda of the campaigns. However, on 6 November, his
organisation published a tragic report on the discovery of 500 corpses in Kenyan forests
(Ngong, Naivasha, Machakos, etc.) The deaths could only have risen from extra-judicial
killings, according to M. Kiai. The police were directly blamed in their fight against the
Mungiki sect in 2007. M. Kiai spoke of crime against humanity.70 Neither the police nor
the government gave an explanation to confirm or deny implication in the matter. All the
newspapers carried this report on 6 November. The Daily Nation went on to demand the
truth from the government in an editorial71 but the press gave the matter little weight,
and completely sidelined a few days later.72
 
Condemnation of election violence
82 The final twist in the coverage of the campaign was violence. In November the party
grassroots elections were poorly conducted and were characterized by chaotic scenes. As
December approached, ethnic tension revived by politicians heightened in the Rift Valley.
The Daily Nation and The Standard then raised moral issues in the wake of an escalating
aggression that quickly degenerated from verbal to physical.
83 In mid-November 2007, the three large political fronts PNU, ODM and ODM-K organized
primary elections to pick their flag bearers for parliamentary and civic elections. These
elections turned out to be a fiasco:73 delays due to disorganisation or missing ballots,
missing election material, vote-buying, irregularities in the counting and even stealing of
ballot boxes were reported in some areas. Violent scenes broke out at party headquarters.
For five days the supporters of successful candidates and those of aspirants who felt they
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had  been  robbed  of  victory  clashed  in  Nairobi  (Westlands  and  Dagoretti),  in  Thika,
Mombasa and Mt Elgon.74 Some candidates were injured in the fights. The losers who
refused to accept defeat lodged complaints with the ECK while most of them contested in
the general  elections on tickets of  different parties.  “Democracy at  its  ugliest” read an
article in The Daily Nation,  pointing an accusing finger at the parties’ incompetence in
organising democratic and fair nominations. The daily equally lashed out at the weakness
of parties and selfishness of Kenyan politicians who only seemed interested in their own
ambitions rather than that of their voters.75
84 The break-out of violence in the Rift Valley was a new development that the print media
condemned  and  attempted  to  sensitize  the  political  class  about.  In  Kuresoi,  the
neighbouring  Molo  district  and  Mt.  Elgon,  trouble  broke  out  between  different
communities  (Kikuyu,  Kalenjin,  and  Kisii)  at  the  beginning  of  October.  Fuelled  by
politicians during campaigns in their respective constituencies, they heightened towards
the end of November and finally turned fatal in December. On 9 December, 25 deaths
were  documented  in  Kuresoi,  16,000  people  were  displaced  and  hundreds  of  houses
torched, quite a “price” to pay for “tribal politics.”76
85 These fatal methods by parties were widely condemned in the print media. Even more
unforgivable  was  the  lack  of  action  by  the  state,  notably  the  government  and  the
provincial administration, which stands accused. The lack of action was both past and
present, given that the violence were recurrence of 1992 clashes instigated by the KANU
government under Moi to discredit multiparty politics.77 The police were criticized for
their inability and/or lack of goodwill to act in order to stop the crisis.78 The Daily Nation
urged the government to intervene fast and at all costs in Kuresoi and Mount Elgon.79
86 The Standard was again heavy in its criticism of the government over its handling of the
crisis, and published scathing opinion articles, as in the Sunday Standard of 9 December
2007: “we are bleeding and dying in Kuresoi; and we are bleeding in the Mount Elgon region. The
country burns while the government watches.” Finally, the Minister for Internal Security,
John Michuki, got round to visiting the affected areas and met the displaced families, but
the clashes persisted.
87 Despite these incidences ahead of the elections, all the newspapers called on the voters to
come  out  in large  numbers  and  vote  peacefully.  They  stressed  that  voting  was  the
cornerstone of democracy. The 27 December front pages, however, revealed uncertainty
in commentaries in light of the atmosphere of Manichaeism and the escalating violence: “
Stay calm and keep the peace” in The Nairobi Star; “We appeal to you to rely on your inner voice
and to preserve harmony and security” in The Standard; “It’s not a war, it’s only an election”
warned The Daily  Nation.  The dailies  were therefore not  in doubt  regarding the next
course of events.
 
Pro-Active journalism by the Kenyan media following
announcement of disputed results
88 The leading Kenyan media displayed professionalism during the election campaign. They
continued to inform after the elections and the announcement of disputed results. They
informed the public of developments, sought to understand political and social reasons
behind the violence in the country. Cautiously, they broadcasted the clashes that claimed
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lives of hundreds of Kenyans. They condemned the two conflicting parties and called on
the people to stay calm and be united for the good of the country.
89 This constructive strategy was referred to as “pro-active journalism,” inspired by the media
activists. This term describes responsible handling of information by the journalists in
conflict situation. Thanks to their presence of mind in urging the public and having a
positive impact on the volatile situation by diligently carrying out the duty—through
education, denouncing stereotypes, honest analysis of the causes of conflict, proposing
alternatives to violence.80
90 Pro-active journalism by the Kenyan media as witnessed during the crisis is a result of
fine training of media players, particularly in the press groupings, and in professional
unity  in  situations  of  crisis.  It  is  rare  to  find  this  quality  in  a  highly  competitive
environment. The re-establishment of the Media Council in 2007 was positive. This self-
regulation body established to mediate between the government and the press was able
to coordinate actions of the profession and defended it against attempts to curtail press
freedom by “Kibaki II.”
 
The elections and parliamentary results
Coverage of elections
91 On the Election Day, 27 December, there was no need to look for something amusing on
the radio or a Brazilian soap opera on television: every programme was dedicated to the
coverage  of  the  elections.  The  press  used  their  “traditional”  network  of  local
correspondents and dispatched reporters throughout the country. Thanks to the mobile
phone, they could keep in touch with the broadcasts and in the case of radio, be on air 24
hours.  Television stations also carried out the important duty of  covering the voting
process in the capital and in the rural areas. As they did during the campaign era, NTV
and KTN led in their presence in the country due to their superior technological capacity
which made it possible to broadcast live from various polling stations and/or send images
with their broadcasts.
92 Radio and television stations formed a network of reporters and correspondents who
kept the listeners and viewers informed the whole day.  In the evening,  this network
functioned in the same manner to report election results live. Due to competition each
group made an effort to air news promptly and quickly analyse preliminary results. Due
to  this  system,  the  initial  test  was  passed.  R. Odinga’s  lead  over  M.  Kibaki  in  the
presidential vote was known, many members of the Kibaki government were finding the
going tough in their constituencies. The pro-ODM wave in the Rift Valley remained strong
despite problems related to the planning of elections and cases of fraud were quickly
reported  to  the  public,  late  opening  of  some  poll  stations,  names  missing  from the
registers, etc.
 
The defeat of sitting ministers in parliamentary elections
93 While waiting for results of the presidential elections, journalists ran a commentary on
parliamentarians. The fall of almost twenty members of M. Kibaki’s cabinet was seen as a
political tsunami. The defeat of Nicholas Biwott and D. arap Moi’s sons (Gideon, Jonathan
and Raymond) in parliamentary elections marked the end of an era, that of the old KANU,
and the end of a family dynasty.81 According to The Daily Nation, the Kalenjin vote against
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Moi’s close allies and family was a strong sign of resentment for the former president.
Clearly the community did not appreciate his alliance with M. Kibaki. In the meantime a
new generation of Kalenjin politicians greatly undermined his political influence over the
community.82 One Sunday Nation commentator could hardly believe that N. Biwott, the
“Total Man” of the Moi era had lost.83 The fine pen of Mutuma Mathiu, Managing Editor of
the same Sunday paper mused:
I am excited because of new promises: where will the Kenyan politics be without
the least liked of all politicians, Nicholas Biwott? (…) when I started as a journalist,
we felt free to criticize Mr. Moi, but we never joked with M. Biwott.84
94 Big men close to M. Kibaki were the biggest losers85 of the parliamentary elections: Moody
Awori,  David  Mwiraria,  Chris  Murungaru,  Simeon  Nyachae,  Njenga  Karume  etc.  and
representatives of the “old guard” like outgoing Minister of Information Kagwe Mutahi
and his predecessor,  Raphael  Tuju.  The Sunday Nation’s  point of  view on this turn of
events was obvious.  The 27 December 2007 election was a protest vote by the people
against the Kibaki government.86
95 Concerning the presidential election, journalists took great care in calming down
emotions and spared no efforts  to defend the ECK which delayed in announcing the
results.87 At end of December, television and radio stations carried out uninterrupted live
broadcasts to report popular discontent, relay the statements by politicians, and recount
proven cases of fraud and the eruption of widespread violent activities.
 
Results of the presidential election and violence: condemnation by
the media and a call for peace
96 Activities of the media when the post-election violence broke out and the reflections of
the two leading Kenyan dailies between 30 December 2007 and 7 January 2008 will be the
focus of this section.
 
Kibaki II and the first attempts to gag the media
97 As the troubles broke out in the country due to delayed announcement of results, it was
through government backed KBC that S. Kivuitu officially declared M. Kibaki winner of
the presidential election on 30 December 2007, three days after the vote. Only KBC could
run the picture of S. Kivuitu in the precincts of the Kenyatta International Conference
Centre  (KICC)  and  all  the  private  television  channels  and  radio  stations  could  only
retransmit the public station’s signals to broadcast the ECK announcement.88
98 This  was  a  dark  day  indeed for  press  freedom in  Kenya as  the  Ministry  of  Internal
Security decided amidst the confusion to suspend live broadcast of all news bulletins in “
the  interest  of  security  and  public  tranquillity,”89 leading  to  country-wide  protests.  In  a
statement,  the government spokesman explained that “in  the present  atmosphere,  some
people are using the media to incite violence,”90 any media house found in breach of this
regulation would be closed down indefinitely.
99 This move was widely condemned by media professionals, various civil society bodies and
foreign  ambassadors.  One radio  station,  Kiss  FM did  not  conform and  continued  to
broadcast live news broadcasts and relayed listeners SMS messages. Radio Lake Victoria
situated in Kisumu, which openly supported R. Odinga, was shut down.
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100 The following day, on 31 December, during a press conference, representatives of the
Media Council  and Media Owners Association91 denounced this measure as “draconian,
unrealistic and amounts to an insult to press freedom in the country.”92 The chairman of the
Media Council, Wachira Waruru, announced that a decision had been taken by the media
owners to ignore the directive not to broadcast live. His defiance was as weighty as the
determination of media players, as pointed out by W. Waruru in his statement:
We, the media owners and the Media Council, have decided today that we are not
going to accept any effort by the government to silence us (…) the media industry is
shocked by the directive of the Minister in charge of Security. We are not going to
obey the slightest directive aimed at controlling the freedom of the press. (…) we
hope the minister retracts this directive and allows us to serve the people of Kenya.
93
101 But the government reaction was categorical, making it clear that the media must comply
and the stations had to stop any live broadcasts. The ban remained in place for over a
month. Following this attempt to gag the media, the leading media powerhouses put aside
their editorial differences and worked together to effect proactive journalism, even as
violence spread throughout Kenya.
 
Confusion and restraint
102 Many deaths were reported during the campaign period (as in Kuresoi), on the Election
Day  and  before  the  announcement  of  results,  but  it  is  especially  after  M.  Kibaki’s
acceptance  statement  that  hatred  and anger  took  root  in  Kenya.  The  private  media
portrayed two realities. On the one hand, M. Kibaki, being sworn in solemnly holding the
Bible and, on the other hand, ODM leaders contesting his re-election and announcing that
R. Odinga was the “legitimate president.”94
103 Scenes  and  images  of  riots,  looting,  clashes  with  the  police,  displaced  people  filled
newspaper pages,  television screens and radio waves.  Reporters from the three main
media houses were dispatched throughout the country: first to Kibera then to other areas
of  Nairobi,  Kisumu,  Nakuru,  Eldoret,  Mombasa,  Molo,  etc.  All  over  the same images,
pictures were shown on television and sounds of brutality were broadcast on radios. The
reports carried scenes of burning cars or looting (Kisumu was a case in point) sometimes
with no commentary (for example on KTN and NTV).
104 Almost forty thousand women and children were burned alive in a church in Eldoret on
31 December and this caused an explosive effect on the reports. Days after this tragedy,
commentaries in the press continued to compare it to the violence that took place in
Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.95 Kenya became aware that ethnic
tragedies did not only take place neighbouring countries. A report of NTV on 7 January
2008 about Kikuyus fleeing the Rift Valley was incredulously titled, “Refugees in our own
country,”  violent  protests  were  strongly  condemned  by  the  media.  There  was
consternation and confusion everywhere. How did we get here? The Daily Nation seemed
to ask.96
105 To avoid stoking the fire, the media decided to be impartial over the regularity of the
polls.  There  would be  no analysis  and limited news on election anomalies  would be
broadcast. The Daily Nation redirected focus on the M. Kibaki’s re-election and pointed out
that he was starting an illegitimate and “very gloomy” second term “especially in the larger
and more populated regions where the perception of a stolen election provoked deep anger”97. By
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31 December, the paper pointed that it would be impossible to reverse the hand of time
and find a procedural explanation of the conflict: only one “political solution” would suffice
between M. Kibaki and R. Odinga, but the paper expressed doubt that the ODM would be
able to calm its supporters.98
106 In  order  to  stay  abreast  with  the  irregularities,  the  newspapers  chose  to  relate
conclusions of the European Union observers and various foreign representatives, who
unanimously condemned the elections as “seriously flawed.”99 Findings such as “serious
problems  in  the  vote-counting  process”100 with  inflated  figures  in  certain  constituencies
(Maragwa, Molo) were provided by the European Union and were published providing
their source.
107 Thus, from reading the Kenyan papers of Anglo-Saxon origin and which separate fact and
analysis, it is easy to see the subtle line between factual articles pointing clearly to an
election that has suffered numerous irregularities in the vote counting process101—with
various  reports  accusing  observers  of  tampering  with  official  figures  but  also
commentaries in the foreign media replicated as “news”102—and opinion articles which
for the sake of quelling ethnic tensions, preferred to remain non-partisan but shift the
blame of post election chaos to the two leading parties and the ECK.
 
Pro-active journalism
108 The Rwandan ghost  and its  “hate  press”  haunted Kenyan journalists.  This  called for
professional  unity  and  an  appeal  for  calm  remained  their  message  in  the  wake  of
escalating violence.
109 On 3 January, the media made a decision to act jointly. The Kenyan newspapers agreed on
one headline: ‘Save Our Beloved Country.’ The televisions carried the message ‘Save Our
Country’ at the base of the screen throughout the day. The radios read editorials of The
Standard and  The  Daily  Nation,  and  used  their  influence  on  listeners  to  appeal  for
individual responsibility. On 6 January, three days after this measure, television and radio
stations put on air a common programme of prayer for peace. The initiative came from
the Media Council, and the Media Owners Association and religious leaders. From 6 to 7
am, pastors, priests, imams and artistes consecutively appeared to deliver messages of
peace and to demand truth and justice on elections. Still in the interest of promoting pro-
active journalism at a time of conflict,  NTV ran a series of special programmes from
3 January 2008 entitled Saving Kenya: Voices of Reason, which aimed at demystifying the
evolution of conflict. The NMG television channel also broadcast a five minute clip on
peace, ‘A Song for Peace,’ at regular intervals.
110 The print media continued in its informing role. It is in The Standard that we learnt that S.
Kivuitu announced results under pressure and that he himself could not tell  the real
winner of the elections.103 The two leading papers acted jointly to bring about a sense of
morality among politicians and readers and encourage negotiations between the two
conflicting  political  parties.  The  array  of  titles  of  their  editorials  following  the
announcement of election results is a clear indication of these efforts: ‘Our leaders must
now preach peace’ (The Daily Nation, 31 December); ‘Our leaders must make peace happen’
(The Daily Nation, 4 January); ‘Peace talks crucial to nation’s survival’ (The Daily Nation, 9
January);  ‘We  must  stop  these  poll  chaos  right  away’  (The  Standard,  30 December);
‘Violence does not help in this crisis’ (The Standard, 1 January); “Hardened positions will only
fuel conflict” (The Standard,  2 January); ‘Let us join all join for the push for peace’ (The
Caught Between Information and Condemnation
Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est / The East African Review, 38 | 2008
21
Standard, 4 January); ‘Let us all support mediation efforts’ (The Standard, 7 January). The




111 In the wake of increasing post electoral violence, journalists accused neither camp in
particular but laid blanket blame on both PNU and ODM who played an instrumental role
in ethnicizing the campaigns,104 while the ECK and its chairman S. Kivuitu continuously
accused the profession of acting unanimously against them.105
112 Media  political  analysts  viewed  the  ODM  campaign  of  “them-against-us”  as  highly
incriminating.  This  accusation  played  a  principal  role  in  whipping  up  anti-Central
Province and simply anti-Kikuyu sentiments in some communities and fuelling ancient
frustrations. This political ethnicization had dire repercussions when it was apparent that
the “Kikuyu party” had stolen the election. The second accusation coming rather late was
that R. Odinga showed no goodwill to end the crisis and contain the violence. M. Kibaki
was accused of playing the waiting game only making half-hearted attempts to quell the
demonstrations. Turning to PNU and the ethnic issue, columnists drew a clear distinction
between the Kikuyu as a people and the elite Kikuyu. The latter is accused of sacrificing
everything to stay in power, driven by the fear of losing control of a “golden economic
era” should the ODM come to power. According to the Sunday Nation:
The crisis in Kenya is not electoral in itself. It is a result of how this election has
been  presented,  and  it  has  been  presented  as  a  conflict  between  the  Kikuyu—
accused of stealing the country’s fortunes and monopolizing power—and a coalition
of other tribes. The ODM alliance appears incapable of convincing the elite Kikuyu
that  Raila’s  presidency  will  not  signify  their  end,  as  they  thought.  The  Kikuyu
thought that if ODM wins the tribe will be destroyed, they will be dispossessed of
their property and those who have settled in various parts of the country will be
decimated.106
113 The last  collective  accusation was  against  S.  Kivuitu  and the ECK over  its  work and
especially the conduct of elections after the announcement of the presidential results. S
Kivuitu’s  work,  which  had  been  considered  “efficient  and  independent”107 on  the
28 December 2007 turned “disastrous” a week later.108 The electoral commission which
declared M. Kibaki winner is held directly responsible by the print media. Its members
did little to resist pressure or manipulation; they hurried to make a proclamation of an
election  marred  by  irregularities,  what  a  legislative  mess.109 An  unwavering  opinion
article read ‘Why Kivuitu must be held accountable for poll  chaos.’  According to the
article, the announcement of M. Kibaki as winner was unconstitutional.110 Finally, The
East African editorial on 7 January 2008 considers that the ECK lost all credibility in this
election. The weekly carried statements by S. Kivuitu and other ECK commissioners, who
failed to challenge the irregularities.  They confirmed being under pressure from the
authorities, worse still they could not tell who won the elections.111 And the final editorial
pushed for a case to reconstitute the electoral commission. It would be suicidal to go into
another election with the same commissioners and the same arrangements. Only Gado, a
cartoonist with The Daily Nation, seems a little considerate with the ECK: a drawing on the
3 January 2007 depicted S. Kivuitu announcing the presidential results with a Kalachnikov
pointed to his neck by a soldier.
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Conclusion
114 In general, the study of the coverage of the campaign, the election itself and the post-
election chaos by the Kenyan media,  specifically by the two leading dailies  The Daily
Nation and The  Standard presented journalism with a  double  role;  that  of  passing on
information  to  the  citizen  and  at  the  same  time  condemning  the  ever  worsening
misconduct of politicians. It brought to light the politicization of media players and their
awareness that can have a great impact on the political and social arena. By carrying out
its duty responsibly and repeatedly appealing for calm, the leading media transformed
themselves into ambassadors in the interest of national unity, thus playing an important
role meant for the opposition.
115 On the other hand the same responsible journalism was accused of unethical work in a
few  isolated  areas—for  example  the  gutter  press  and  radio  stations  broadcasting  in
vernacular, like Kass FM—whose criticism was synonymous with the degradation of the
mainstream media.
116 We can also point out that from the election campaigns to the post-election violence; the
Kenyan media defended its freedom, its right to inform despite political pressure. The
professional unity after 30 December 2007 and unity of purpose in practising pro-active
journalism represented a new chapter in this strongly contested environment for the
future. Finally, the by launching the new Media Council, through the voice of W. Waruru,
who was unanimously recognized as a reputable media icon, the profession in a way
found its self-regulation footing that had eluded it for long… and this goes down as one of
the rare positive points in Kenya following the 2007 general elections.
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NOTES
1. The study took the form of a three week survey in Nairobi where most of the media
stakeholders are based,  semi-informal meetings with journalists and managers of  the
three main media categories (print, radio and television) as well as observation of live
broadcasts. A qualitative analysis of the press was carried done following the election
campaigns through the country’s two leading dailies, The Daily Nation and The Standard,
from 27 November to 27 December 2007. This was also possible through the web sites of
the two newspapers.
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2. “Kenyans are political animals, almost to the last man and woman, and 14.2 million of them
have registered to vote in the 10th General Election on December 27. They are avid consumers of
media content.” The Standard, 7 November 2007, ‘The Kenyan media environment.’
3. B. Rambaud and A.-J. Tudesq, 2007.
4. The Daily Nation, 29 December 2007: ‘Kibaki’s greatest legacy is freedom of expression.’
5. B. Rambaud and A.-J. Tudesq, 2007.
6. An article of The Standard, published on 25 February 2006, on a secret meeting between
M. Kibaki and his opponent K. Musyoka may have displeased some people at State House.
7. Reporters sans frontières, ‘Le gouvernement ordre un boycott publicitaire des médias
du Standard Group.’ 19 avril 2007.
8. Source: Nation Media Group (NMG) distribution department, December 2007. It is noted
that  The  Sunday Nation distributes  220,000 copies  every Sunday;  it  is  the best  selling
newspaper in East Africa and one of the best selling in black Africa. 
9. Source: Standard Group distribution department, December 2007. The Sunday Standard
send out 100,000 copies.
10. Interview with Willy Kimanzi, editor in chief Weekly Citizen, 11 December 2007
11. For example, one of the legal battles between the two largest private stations that
caught public attention was the right to air the successful American soap opera, Desperate
Housewives. KTN emerged victorious.
12. Thanks to colonialisation by England, journalism in Kenya is a mirror image of Anglo-
Saxon tradition, distinctly separating fact and analyses.
13. Interview with F.O. Wanyama, Editorial Administration Manager of NMG, 6 December
2007. PNU and ODM put pressure on the giant media houses in an effort to influence them
in the coverage of elections. ODM published an open letter to the Nation Media Group
accusing it of openly covering the elections in favour of PNU (Expression Today, November
2007, pages 18–19: ‘Kenya: ODM accuses major Kenyan paper’). PNU also sent a similar
letter to The Standard Group in early November (The Daily Nation, 9 November 2007 : ‘High
poll stakes lead to in-depth media coverage scrutiny’).
14. The prize goes to the latter newspaper which dedicated 40 out of 56 pages in its 23
December edition on election campaigns. Refer to The Sunday Standard, 23 December 2007:
‘History in the making.’
15. Steadman and Associates International Research Center, Kenya Media Diaries, Quarter
4, Nairobi, 2005.
16. Interview with Emmanuel Juma, Head of TV News, NTV on 11 December 2007.
17. The Sunday Standard,  9  December 2007:  ‘Campaigns move to the Internet and cell
phones.’
18. http://politics.nationmedia.com [archive].
19. Each video was seen by tens of thousands of surfers since the YouTube site registers
10 to 40,000 clicks  per  online video.  After  the troubles  that  broke out  following the
disputed presidential election results, the videos showing images of the demonstrations
and looting scenes were the most popular. For example, the report ‘Nairobi: Violence and
Refugees’ posted on the 2 January 2008 on the site was visited more 53,000 times in a
week.
20. http://www.eastandard.net/electionplatform [archive].
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21. Currently  a  journalism  lecturer.  http://www.blogger.com/
profile/13054323858001450971. [archive].
22. http://www.kibakitena.org  [ archive];  http://www.raila07.com  [archive];  http://
www.kalonzomusyokaforpresident.co.ke [archive].
23. The Standard, 5 December 2007, ‘We are not amused.’
24. The official ballot papers are printed in England. The Daily Nation, 5 December 2007.
25. The Standard, 4 December 2007.
26. This was the case with Agenda Kenya of NTV. Emmanuel Juma, Head of TV News for the
station explains, “the use of SMS is a success. The mobile phone is a phenomenal communication
tool here, an as you know Kenyans want to participate in debates, give their opinions. Ironically, it
is the rural folks and those living in provincial towns communicate by SMS, not the Nairobians.”
27. The Assistant Minister of  information,  Koigi  wa Wamwere,  also talks of  ‘political
activists’:  ‘Journalists  enter politics  as an instinctive confirmation of  what they are—
activists.’ The Standard, 7 November 2007: ‘From Newsroom to Parliament.’
28. We witnessed that in the promotion of journalists in KBC—notably in the KBC Board
of Directors and in the managerial team and in the Ministry of Information, only the
Kikuyu, from the president’s ethnic group or close to his network of friends, benefitted.
29. Meeting with Mugo Theuri, editor in chief of People Daily, 4 December 2007.
30. The Daily Nation, 14 December 2007: ‘You’re biaised, Kivuitu tells KBC.’
31. Kiruri  Kamau,  former  editor-in-chief  of  the  Leader,  had  to  leave  the  group  for
disobeying  his  boss’  orders  not  to  publish  an  article  criticizing  M.  Kibaki.  Source:
Interview with Kiruri Kamau, 5 December 2007.
32. Source: B. Wangari, op. cit.
33. The  Daily  Nation,  31  October  2007:  ‘Vernacular  radio  stations  accused  over  hate
speech.’
34. The EastAfrican, 20 November 2007: ‘Let’s check ourselves on hate speech.’
35. It is all a game. Source : Interview with Chris Odwesso, editor-in-chief of Kenya Times,
13 December 2007.
36. Reconstitution in accordance with the Kenya Media Act which came into effect in
October  2007.  The  new  Media  Council  brought  together  media  professionals  (media
owners, journalists and the Kenya Union of Journalists), members of the civil society (like
the Law Society of Kenya) and members of the government. Its objectives are not only to
sort out disagreements between the government and the media but also between the
media and the public; to promote independence and freedom of the media; to encourage
training and ethics among journalists. The reconstitution of this self-regulation body was
a positive move: the Media Council earlier existed as an empty shell commanding little
respect from the profession since its formation in 2000. See Expression Today, November
2007, ‘Statutory Media Council is here.’ pp. 4–5.
37. http://www.strategicafrica.com/uploads [not available. Website Archive].
38. http://www.steadman-group.com/monitoring-index.php [not available. Archive].
39. Newspaper readers have admitted not reading The Daily Nation because “it is a Kikuyu
paper”…
40. According to The Standard, the surprise candidature of K. Matiba in the presidential
election “has been viewed as not so much out of a conviction to win the race, or even become an
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MP,  but  a  statement  to  spite  President  Kibaki”  (The  Sunday  Standard,  2  December  2007:
‘Matiba’s feeble comeback could cause shockwaves’).
41. These two critics  are omnipresent in The Standard’s  opinion columns.  During the
elections campaigns, the daily for example published an interview with John Githongo,
former Ethics and Governance Permanent Secretary in M. Kibaki government who had to
go on exile after denouncing growing corruption in the NARC cabinet. On the first three
pages, J. Githongo denounced “the arrogance and corruption of a clique of cynical old men”; he
said that M. Kibaki did not honour the pledges in its 2002 election manifesto and should
judged on the strength of  its  failures  on 27 December 2007.  The  Sunday Standard,  16
December 2007: ‘Githongo breaks silence.’
42. Interview with Douglas Okwatch, The Standard news editor, 10 December 2007.
43. Interview with F.O. Wanyama, Editorial administration manager of NMG, op. cit.
44. Interview with J. Kisero, Managing Editor of The EastAfrican, 12 December 2007.
45. There was a unity among all the social groups to remove D. arap Moi from power and
the two principal candidates M. Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta, were Kikuyu.
46. According to Chris Odwesso, of Kenya Times: “Every community should be represented in
the Cabinet but it’s not the case. It’s driven by one region. The second Cabinet of Kibaki was a
mistake, a frustration for many communities, which think their underdevelopment is due to this
issue. Administration was seen as reserved to one particular ethnic group. Raila surfed on the wave
of frustration in 2005, and he’s been doing the same in 2007.” Source: Interview, op. cit.
Journalists are not the only ones to launch this attack on Kibaki. During the electoral
campaign, some civil society organisations under the watch of the Kenya Human Rights
Commission (KHRC)  denounced his  political  and administrative  promotion of  Kikuyu
under M. Kibaki.  Through its  director,  Muthoni Wanyeki:  “Appointments  to  positions  of
influence in the cabinet and elsewhere have taken an ethnic angle. Allocation of public resources
has depended on ethnicity,” in The Standard, 5 December 2007: ‘Rights body accuses State.’
47. Proof: Radio advertisements by ODM for example were bold—“It’s time for a tribalism-
free policy” and “It’s time for a corruption-free government,” signifying that the PNU camp
was both tribalist and corrupt.
48. A example of special dossier on Sunday Nation of 16 December 2007: ‘Battle of dirty
politics.’  Kipkoech  Tanui,  Managing  Editor  of  Sunday  Standard,  makes  the  same
observation: “The reality of our political campaigns, dirtier as it gets, is that they are outcome-
oriented. […] The thirst for victory kills conscience. […] In all cases of dirty politics what is never in
doubt  is  that  all  the  parties  in  the  contest  end up with egg on the  face” (The Standard,  30
November 2007: ‘Propaganda wars spare no politician in dirty fights’).
49. The Standard, 24 December 2007: ‘Election is about legacy of ethnicity in the State.’ The
rubric ‘The Making of the Nation’ in The Daily Nation supports it too.
50. The  Daily  Nation,  24  December  2007:  ‘We  must  strive  to  detribalise  our  political
allegiances.’
51. The Daily Nation, 3 December 2007: ‘Spare youth your ethnic bigotry.’
52. The Daily Nation, 29 November 2007: ‘Why must we blame everyone but ourselves over
tribalism?’ The Standard, 5 December 2007: ‘Resist ethnic pressure.’
53. Magesha Mguiri, Opinion Editor of the Daily Nation, 11 December 2007.
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54. The Independent, 17 December 2007: ‘Raila and Hitler: are they alike?’ The comparisons
are: like Hitler, Raila wants power at all costs; like Hitler, Raila does not believe in God;
the hatred of Hitler towards Jews is the same as Raila towards the Kikuyu.
55. The Weekly Citizen, 10 December 2007: ‘Few days to power!’
56. The Weekly Citizen, 17 December 2007: ‘First family packing from State House.’
57. It is mostly ODM that accused the government of planning election fraud. We were
then treated to  an “attack-defence”  match between ODM and the ECK,  mandated to
oversee  the  elections.  The  Standard on  4  December  2007,  for  example  dedicated  its
headlines and its page 3 to a complaint raised by ODM against ECK: ‘Rigging probe. Free
and fair?’ The ODM campaign team met S. Kivuitu to complain about fake ballot papers:
according to ODM, the ‘parallel’ ballots were to be printed in Belgium. S. Kivuitu asked to
be shown the facts of the these allegations and gave assurances that he is going to carry
out investigations for his part. Another attack by ODM: according to the R. Odinga- led
party, 188,222 voters were registered more than once on the registers and that 100,000
registered  voters  were  dead.  S.  Kivuitu  defended  himself  and  recalled  that  20,000
international observers will be deployed locally.
58. The Standard, 20 December 2007: ‘Fantasy or reality.’
59. The Standard, 10 December 2007: ‘Campaigns are still not issue based or practical.’
60. The Daily Nation, 15 December 2007: ‘Money factor in Parliament race.’
61. The Daily Nation, 15 December 2007: ‘Leaders who invested big cash and lost.’
62. The Standard, 18 December 2007: ‘Behaving badly.’
63. The Standard, 18 December 2007: ‘We won’t stand for misuse of resources.’
64. See the article by Patrick Mutahi on opinion polls, published in this volume.
65. For example, 14 December 2007, in 3 articles published on the page titled ‘The Big
Three Debate’ in The Standard, the article of PNU camp written by Muthui Kariuki (‘ODM
proposals would increase national deficit’) strongly criticized the economic propositions
of ODM, denouncing as impractical mesures such as social protection for the poor and a
new constitution in six months. On the ODM, side secretary-general Anyang’ Nyong’o
wrote an anti-PNU commentary (‘PNU should not pass the buck on corruption’) which
shows that M. Kibaki had lost the fight against corruption. He also said that PNU was
planning to steal the election and compared this envisaged act to the 1982 coup d’Etat
against D. arap Moi! Only ODM-K desisted from attacking opponents and gave details of
its  policy:  Samuel  Poghisio  detailed  the  plans  his  party  had  for  the  Rift  Valley,
particularly in the agrcultural sector.
66. The Sunday Standard, 2 December 2007 : ‘First Lady’s allowance increase is ridiculous.’
67. The Daily Nation, 26 October 2007: ‘ODM and Catholics clash over majimbo.’
68. The Daily Nation, 28 November 2007: ‘Revealed: Raila’s real MoU with Muslims.’
69. The Daily Nation, 20 November 2007: ‘ODM pact with Muslims denounced.’ The Daily
Nation, 29 November 2007: ‘Now Churches condemn MoU with Muslims.’ The Christian
churches did not want to lose their political influence to Muslim leaders.
70. The Daily Nation, 8 November 2007: ‘Rights body gives more evidence.’
71. The Daily Nation, 6 November 2007: ‘Bodies: Kenyans want to know the truth.’
72. The Daily Nation, 9 November 2007: ‘High poll stakes lead to in-depth media coverage
scrutiny.’
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